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Allow me to begin by expressing my gratitude to Karsten Struhl and the editors of 
Comparative Philosophy for the opportunity to engage with these ideas. This work is 
very close to my heart and I am always keen for the opportunity to work through the 
details in partnership with like-minded scholars. Struhl’s (2020) paper gave me a lot to 
think about, and so for my reply I will divide my remarks into three sets of questions. 
To begin, I explore Struhl’s approach to Buddhist philosophy and the role that Buddhist 
modernism is playing as a frame for his hermeneutical choices. I suggest here that 
spreading his attention to other sources of Buddhist philosophy beyond the Pāli suttas 
would help strengthen his argument and the connective tissue between Buddhist and 
contemporary approaches to the negation of self. In the second section, I look at the 
relevant differences between Buddhist and modern scientific approaches to the 
negation of self and suggest that these approaches have less in common than Struhl 
suggests. Finally, I turn to the Buddhist soteriological project that motivates their 
approach to self-negation and to Struhl’s reflections on the problem of suffering and its 
solution through vipassanā meditation. Here I present an alternative way of 
understanding the problem and its solution in a Buddhist philosophical register.  
 
1. BUDDHIST MODERNISM AND HERMENEUTICS 
 
Struhl begins his paper with a common trope that early Buddhism – indeed, for many, 
the Buddha himself – never denied the existence of the self: “It is important to say at 
the outset that Buddhism is not denying that there exists a self in any sense of the term”  
(Struhl 2020, 114). He then goes on to quote Olendzki (2016, 41) and Batchelor (2011, 
________________________ 
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133) who both say something similar. They also both attribute the view (or lack thereof) 
to ‘The Buddha’ and ‘Gotama’.  This kind of framing is very modernist and susceptible 
to a number of philological and conceptual critiques that Stuhl need not take on for 
himself.  
 For starters, the remainder of his paper is relentlessly anti-realist about the self, so 
it’s not clear what purpose is served by claiming the Buddha wasn’t a full-blow 
metaphysical anti-realist about the self.1 Second, it’s philologically suspect to claim 
that the Pāli suttas give us any clear understanding of what the historical Buddha 
actually thought. Of course there are those who disagree; the author’s Struhl cites are 
good examples. But they are also committed Buddhists and their work attempts to do 
problematic historical end-runs around the Buddhist traditions that arise in response to 
the Pāli canon and its Chinese āgama parallels.2 Third, this claim is almost certainly 
false. While it is true that the Buddha is never portrayed in the suttas as coming flat out 
and saying ‘there is no self’, he does say that ‘all dhamma-s are not-self’ (sabbe 
dhammā anattā) in a number of places (e.g. Dhp XX, 279).3 Further, this claim about 
dhamma-s directly entails the non-existence of the self. Additionally, the entire Indian 
Buddhist tradition, including the Pāli Abhidhamma and commentarial texts, are 
relentless in their metaphysical anti-realism about the self. Thus, portraying the suttas 
as agnostic about the existence of the self introduces a substantial schism into Buddhist 
philosophical hermeneutics, one that is either tacitly or explicitly committed to the 
claim that the entire Indian tradition of Buddhist philosophy got the suttas wrong 
(Smith, forthcoming). I’m not sure if this is the kind of commitment Struhl wants to 
build into his argument.4  
 Struhl then goes on to parse the argument from control in the Anattalakkhana Sutta 
(SN III 66) claiming that: “For the self to be an agent, for it to be an executive control 
center, it must be capable of controlling each of the aggregates. But again none of the 
aggregates either separately or collectively is subject to control. We cannot control the 
processes that arise in either the mind or the body. Thus, here again, none of the 
aggregates either separately or collectively can be a self” (Struhl 2020, 116). There is 
a subtle discrepancy here between how Struhl understands the argument and what the 
text actually reports. Here’s the relevant passage:  
 
Form, bhikkhus is not self…Feeling is not self...apperception is not self... formations are 
not self...Consciousness is not self. For if, bhikkhus, consciousness were self, this 
consciousness would not lead to affliction, and it would be possible in consciousness: ‘Let 
my consciousness be thus; let my consciousness not be thus.’ But because consciousness 
 
1 By ‘metaphysical anti-realism about the self’ I mean the view that there is no such thing as a self. 
2 Another example is Gombrich (2009). 
3 See Hamilton (2000, 19) and fn. 3 on p. 31 for the following references: AN I, 286; Dhp 5-7 and 277-
79; MN I, 336; DN II, 157. 
4 It is also important to understand the place of anattā theory in Buddhist philosophy. Struhl claims that 
“For Buddhism, the proximate cause of this suffering is craving and attachment, but this is, in turn, 
generated by the belief in the self as defined above” (2020, 115). But the generation of craving is caused 
by vedanā not the belief in self. In the 10 and 12 point schemes of dependent origination the condition 
(paccaya) for the arising of craving is vedanā. 
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is not self, consciousness leads to affliction, it is not possible in consciousness: ‘Let my 
consciousness be thus; let my consciousness not be thus.’ 5, 6 
 
For Struhl, the self is understood as something separate from the aggregates and its 
status as a self is measured by the extent to which it is capable of controlling them. By 
contrast, in the text, it is the aggregates themselves that are being canvassed as possible 
candidates for being the self. The criterion for selfhood is not an aggregate-independent 
controller of one or all of the aggregates. Instead, each aggregate is considered and 
rejected as being the self because they are not subject to the exercise of control. That 
is, the aggregates are not the self because they can’t be controlled.7  
  Struhl then points out that this argument, as well as the argument from 
impermanence, do not yet get us all the way to metaphysical anti-realism about the self: 
“However, these arguments alone could not establish that there is no self, since the self 
could in principle be something beyond the aggregates, something which is permanent 
and which controls the aggregates but which is not itself one of the aggregates, 
something that is a possessor and observer of the aggregates but not itself the 
aggregates” (Struhl 2020, 116). This is a common claim made by those Pāli apologists 
who wish to construe the Buddha of the suttas as a metaphysical agnostic (see Davis 
2016 in addition to the references above). However, the relevant reply to such reasoning 
is in the following passage: “Bhikkhus, indeed whatever recluses or brahmins, (who), 
regard the self in different ways, in so regarding, they all regard the five aggregates 
subject to clinging or a certain one of these” (SN III, 46; see also Bodhi 2017, 33).8 
This passage is attempting an exhaustiveness claim; any recluse who has any view of 
the self will actually be mistaking the self for one or more of the aggregates. Therefore, 
this exhaustiveness claim coupled with the conclusions of the arguments from control 
and impermanence entail that there are no selves.9 As far as I can tell, this result is good 
news for Struhl because it makes the lines of argument he considers from the suttas 
more resonant with his contemporary sources. But as I shall point out below, even with 
a more consistently anti-realist construal of the suttas in hand, there remain important 
methodological and metaphysical differences between Buddhist anti-realism about the 




5 All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. I use suttacentral.net and the online Digital Pāli 
reader for the root text. I cite the PTS editions as is the scholarly standard. I include English editions of 
the relevant texts in the bibliography. 
6 rūpaṃ, bhikkhave, anattā…vedanā anattā… saññā anattā… saṅkhārā anattā…viññāṇaṃ anattā. 
viññāṇañca hidaṃ, bhikkhave, attā abhavissa, nayidaṃ viññāṇaṃ ābādhāya saṃvatteyya, labbhetha ca 
viññāṇe: ‘evaṃ me viññāṇaṃ hotu, evaṃ me viññāṇaṃ mā ahosī’ti. yasmā ca kho, bhikkhave, viññāṇaṃ 
anattā, tasmā viññāṇaṃ ābādhāya saṃvattāti, na ca labbhati viññāṇe: ‘evaṃ me viññāṇaṃ hotu, evaṃ 
me viññāṇaṃ mā ahosī’ti. 
7 For more on this argument, see Wynne (2009). 
8Ye hi keci, bhikkhave, samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā anekavihitaṃ attānaṃ samanupassamānā samanupass
anti, sabbe te pañcupādānakkhandhe samanupassanti, etesaṃ vā aññataraṃ. 
9 See Smith (forthcoming) for an extended treatment of this issue.  
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2. BUDDHIST VS. SCIENTIFIC NEGATION OF SELF  
 
I now wish to treat of Struhl’s interpretation of neuroscience and biology. First, I point 
out some relevant differences between contemporary scientific approaches to self-
negation – what Evan Thompson (2015, 322) calls ‘neuro-nihilism’ – and Buddhist 
approaches to self-negation. While Struhl seems to think the connections are clear and 
transparent, I’m not so sure. Second, I want to briefly explore Struhl’s considerations 
of biology and Buddhist self-negation. Here I will suggest that there are multiple ways 
to construe this connection and that Struhl’s favored way may not be the most apt.  
 
2.1  NEUROPHILOSOPHY AND ANTI-REAALISM ABOUT THE SELF 
 
Struhl’s main ally here is philosopher Thomas Metzinger (2003; 2009; 2011). Struhl 
sees Metzinger’s anti-realism about the self as helpful for analyzing the ‘underlying 
causes’ of the phenomenal self (Struhl 2020, 124). One relevant point here is that 
Metzinger is an identity theorist about physical and mental events, he thinks that 
phenomenal states are identical with brain states (Metzinger 2003). The language of 
cause and effect implies a difference of identity between causal relata. So, if a brain 
state is the cause of a phenomenal state, then the two cannot be identical. Thus, for 
Metzinger, brain states don’t cause mental states, they are mental states. This fact bears 
on the way in which Metzinger’s brand of anti-realism about the self differs from 
Buddhist approaches. Metzinger’s underlying metaphysical commitments to 
physicalism and neural-representationalism motivate his anti-realism about selves. 
These commitments are not at the forefront of Strulh’s consideration of Metzinger’s 
contribution, but I wonder if centering them more might affect our understanding of 
the relevance of Metzinger’s scientific approach to anti-realism about the self in 
comparison with Buddhist approaches.  
 For Metzinger, our sense of self and our sense of being intentionally related to a 
phenomenally experienced world are the results of neural simulations – for the self, it’s 
a Phenomenal Self Model (PSM) and for the intentionality relation it’s a Phenomenal 
Model of the Intentionality Relation (PMIR) (Metziner 2003). What makes the self an 
illusion is that it is merely a neural simulation. All there really is, is the coordinated 
biochemical pulsations of the neural system in response to stimuli from the 
environment. The phenomenal self and its experiential world are simply neutrally 
generated user-illusions. What is actually real is the physical events in the brain that 
physically realize these user illusions.  
  My question at this juncture is: how does this brain-bounded simulational 
representationalism square with Buddhist views that see the mind and body as 
dynamically related phenomena? For Buddhist philosophers, even those who disagree 
strongly with each other about metaphysics – like Abhidharmikas and Madhyamikas, 
for example – mental categories corresponding to what we would call ‘consciousness’ 
are explanatorily basic in various conceptual schemes that are used to analytically 
decompose the self. For example, in Abhidharmic analysis, Pāli terms like viṇṇāna and 
vedanā constitute irreducible members of the explanatory base to which the self (atta) 
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is reduced.10 Therefore, for the Buddhist philosopher, what is being reduced or 
eliminated (the self) is reduced to a reduction base which is in fact real. That reduction 
base includes phenomenal kinds which are explanatorily, and in some cases, 
metaphysically basic. By contrast, for Metzinger, the reduction base is nothing but non-
phenomenal neural events.11 Thus, my question for Struhl at this juncture is how he 
understands the relationship between Buddhist anti-realism about the self and modern 
scientific anti-realism about the self? These two approaches to the self-as-illusion have 
very different understandings of what the self is being reduced to. For Buddhist 
philosophers, the reduction base contains phenomenal kinds, for Metzinger the 
reduction base is strictly neuro-physical. So, how could Metzinger’s physicalist brand 
of illusionism about the self be consistent with a variety of Buddhist approaches to anti-
realism about the self? There is also an important difference here about how the 
phenomenology is construed. For Metzinger, the infrastructure of the PSM and PMIR 
is constitutively egocentric (2003, 2; 2011, 291). The elimination of self occurs across 
levels of description from the phenomenally personal to the neurally impersonal, how 
things seem first-personally is preserved. By contrast, for Buddhist philosophers, the 
elimination of self occurs within the framework of experience where phenomenal kinds 
constitute parts of the reduction base; self is an illusion, consciousness is not.12 This 
means that there is something it is like to be selfless for the Buddhist. Now, we argue 
that the Buddhist position is inconsistent on this point, but understanding the relevant 
differences is important here if we want to use disparate historical and conceptual 
resources to argue for a systematic point about what there is or isn’t in the world.  
 
2.2  EVOLUTIONAARY BIOLOGY AND THE USES OF THE SELF 
 
I now transition to a brief treatment of Struhl’s attempt to marry Buddhist anti-realism 
about the self with evolutionary biology. Struhl uses biological categories to interpret 
the function of the PSM so as to pose a dilemma for the Buddhist anti-realist about the 
self. Here I will try to answer that dilemma on behalf of the Buddhist philosophers and 
offer some questions about Struhl’s use of biological categories to interpret Buddhist 
philosophical views.  
 Struhl’s point here, as far as I can tell, is that the PSM is powerfully useful in spite 
of its status as a neutrally generated user-illusion. “It is a device for directing our 
behaviors so that we can efficiently navigate both the physical and social world… The 
 
10 This is true of Madhyamikas as well, but with the difference that Madhyamaka thought eschews any 
kind of foundationalism. In what immediately follows, I use the language of ‘reduction’ and ‘reduction 
base,’ terms that would make a Madhyamika uncomfortable. Even so, these Buddhist philosophers 
embrace the philosophical psychology of Buddhist soteriology without reifying the referents of those 
terms. Perhaps the same cannot be said of their Abhidharmika counterparts. I cannot get any further into 
the philosophical specifics here; for more, see Westerhoff (2009).  
11 It is important to note that some contemporary Buddhist philosophers have tried to make Buddhist 
philosophical psychology consistent with contemporary scientific naturalism (Garfield 2015; Siderits 
2013). But these views are creative re-imaginings of Buddhist ontological commitments rather than 
faithful reconstructions. 
12 Or, if consciousness is an illusion, so is everything else that is dependently originated. 
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illusion of self also has an important internal function for the human organism. It 
evolved so that a multitude of experiences which would otherwise be fragmented could 
be bound together” (Struhl 2020, 127). Struhl then uses this point about utility and 
causal efficacy to generate a dilemma for Buddhist anti-realism about the self. He 
explains: “We are now left with a dilemma for Buddhism’s soteriological project. 
Buddhism insists that the illusion of self is the ultimate cause of dukkha and argues that 
enlightenment requires extinguishing this illusion. On the other hand, Buddhists need 
to recognize that the illusion of self is at least highly useful if not essential for the 
survival and continued development of the human species” (Struhl 2020, 128). I have 
two replies to offer on behalf of the Buddhist philosopher here. The first is: assuming 
the definition of the PSM Struhl is working with here, why should we consider such a 
device an illusion? From a Buddhist perspective, something’s having causal efficacy 
marks it as real, so if the PSM has causal efficacy, then it’s real. So, even if we buy 
into Metzinger and Struhl’s view that there is a neural PSM, it’s not clear why that 
entity would be an illusion.  Second, Buddhists would deny that the PSM bears the 
causal load ascribed to it here but would instead advert to the distributed local processes 
that collectively organize behavior (dharma-s). These organized constituents are both 
psychological and physical (rather than just neural). Thus, from a Buddhist point of 
view, we can understand the sense we have of ourselves as a unified phenomenal self 
in terms of what Mark Siderits calls a ‘shifting coalition’ of psychological and physical 
processes that generate that sense (Siderits 2007, 49). As Siderits points out, “…it need 
not be the same part of the person that performs the executive function on every 
occasion” (ibid). When we recognize that different parts of the system are capable of 
achieving executive function in concert with other parts of the system, the problem of 
assuming a central PSM disappears. That is, there is no need for a one-to-one mapping 
from the phenomenology of self to the neural implementation of the self. Such a 
mapping reifies the illusion of singularity that is present at the phenomenal level of 
description into the neural architecture.13 
 It is also worth emphasizing that this debate about whether or not we need a 
functional definition of a self or person – at the neural level via Metzinger’s PSM, or 
even just a notion of personhood more generally to explain the alleged utility of 
conceiving of ourselves as selves – is a topic of intense debate in the history of Buddhist 
philosophy. In particular, Vasubadhu’s debate with the Pudgalavādins seems extremely 
important here (see Lusthaus 2009 and Duerlinger 2009 in Edelglass and Garfield 
2009). The Pudgalavādins echo Struhl’s point about utility by claiming that without 
some notion of personhood that is neither reducible to, nor wholly independent from, 
the psychophysical elements that compose the individual, the Buddhist philosopher is 
in no position to explain the diachronic continuity of person stages that individuate us 
as the karmically situated beings that we are. Vasubandhu replies that causal continuity 
among the dharma-s is more than sufficient to do this explanatory work. I mention this 
point by way of noting that the relevance of Buddhist philosophy to debates about self 
 
13 Though, see Christoff et al. (2011) – pace Metzinger (2003; 2011) - for a scientifically informed 
argument that the self is a perfectly viable construct for neuroscience.  
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and personhood and the nature of that illusion extend far beyond the ken of the Pāli 
suttas and that consideration of these debates might be an avenue for enriching the 
discussion and making the conceptual connections between modern scientific 
approaches to anti-realism about the self and Buddhist approaches more consonant with 
one another.  
 Another intriguing place where Struhl’s Buddhist-inspired anti-realism makes 
contact with biological science is in his endorsement of Wright’s recent book Why 
Buddhism is True (2018). Both Struhl and Wright employ genocentric evolutionary 
biology as a hermeneutical lens for diagnosing the kinds of craving-based attitudes 
Buddhist philosophy is at pains to reject. For Struhl and Wright, our minds are the 
results of selection pressures that have shaped our cognitive habits. These habits 
function to extend the reproductive cycle. In Struhl’s words, “The grid of natural 
selection does not function to develop an accurate perception of reality but to perpetuate 
and proliferate the gene pool” (Struhl 2020, 127). The idea here is that the pervasive 
force of natural selection has shaped us to be craving oriented appropriators and 
replicators, proliferators of genes, and by Buddhist lights, proliferators also of samsāric 
continuity and dukkha. By contrast, the Buddhist path of liberation helps us to see 
things as they are rather than just as natural selection intended us to see them. Seeing 
things as they are helps us escape from the problematic influence of our genetic 
programming.  
Evan Thompson’s critique of this way of thinking about the connection between 
Buddhist philosophy and modern science is thorough and devastating (Thompson 
2020, Ch. 2). Instead of rehearsing his many points, I will content myself with one 
alternative suggestion for conceptualizing this connection and encourage all interested 
parties to read Thompson’s entire book with care. My suggestion is this: natural 
selection is perhaps not best thought of as something that functions on perceptual 
systems for a purpose because evolution doesn’t have norms or values. Evolution by 
natural selection is the result of blind processes of organisms struggling in their 
environments and in so doing passing on phenotypes that help their progeny continue 
that struggle (see Walsh 2015). That organisms struggle this way means that living 
beings are not just the passive receivers of naturally selected for traits. Rather, 
“…organisms modify the environment in regular ways that thereby impose systematic 
biases on selection pressures that they themselves generate” (Thompson 2020, 65). 
Such a view accords much more closely with Buddhist views of the karmic construction 
of the world (loke) through the collective intentions (cetanā) of those sentient beings 
who live in and thereby shape those worlds. Thus, my suggestion here is that the 
connective tissue between evolutionary biology and Buddhist soteriology might be 
closer than Struhl thinks but that this further closeness eludes his construal of this 
connection because of his reliance on Wright’s problematic endorsements of 
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3. THE SOTERIOLOGICAAL PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION 
 
In my final set of questions, I want to engage with Struhl’s interpretation of Buddhist 
soteriology and the practice of vipassanā meditation. I will suggest alternative ways of 
understanding Buddhist soteriology and meditation practice. Contrary to Struhl and 
Siderits’s (2015) view, I claim that there is a notion of meaning and purposefulness in 
life available to the Buddhist that does not entail the existence of a self (Parfit 1984, 
281). Additionally, I will argue that we should not think of mindfulness meditation as 
a way of verifying Buddhist philosophical insights but as a way of actively conditioning 
the perceptual apparatus such that those Buddhist principles and views we antecedently 
endorse become pre-reflective ways of taking up with our world, thus transforming us 
and our experience of that world (Shulman 2014).  
 The problem that Buddhists are trying to solve is the problem of dukkha, it has 
several dimensions, which are elaborated on in some detail by Abhidharmic 
commentators like Buddhaghosa (see Vis 499, XVI 34-35). One of the most pertinent 
aspects of our existential predicament is the inevitability of death. The end of the path 
of practice that helps one overcome death is nibbāna, the cessation (nirodha) of craving 
(taṇha) and ignorance (avijja). One of the many epithets of nibbāna is the deathless 
(amatta). Struhl and Siderits (2015) interpret death as a problem because its 
inevitability prevents us from living happy lives. Following Siderits (2015), Struhl 
claims that (Struhl 2020, 121):  
  
…the wish that life does not end with death is also motivated by the general goal of human 
happiness insofar as that goal is bound up with the attempt to give one’s life meaning and 
purpose as a whole, a meaning and purpose which go beyond and situate our specific 
projects in the more encompassing project of human happiness. Belief in the self gives one 
the sense of being the narrator and central character of one’s life and, therefore, gives one’s 
life events a sense of a larger meaning and purpose. But this, in turn, requires that this 
“self” be open continuously to the future. Without such a central character, the more 
general goal of human happiness seems insubstantial and transient. 
 
In a footnote to the above passage, Struhl approvingly cites Siderits (2015, 46): 
“Realizing one’s mortality radically undermines this [happiness-seeking] enterprise. 
The difficulty is not just that my present projects come to seem parochial and thus 
trivial…[but] that such projects derive their point from the larger happiness-seeking 
project in which we are engaged, and this requires that there be a self with an open 
future.” Although it might appear a bit on the nose, I think it’s important to emphasize 
here that Buddhist philosophy is united in its view that to conceive of one’s self as an 
unchanging controller self plays a major part in keeping one embroiled in saṃsāric 
conditioning and thus subject to dukkha. Śāntideva puts the point in an admirably direct 
way: “If one does not let go of self one cannot let go of suffering, as one who does not 
let go of fire cannot let go of burning” (BCV VIII, 135).  
 But what’s the reasoning here? I think Parfit gives us a really clear explanation that 
needs to be kept in mind when exploring the existential and soteriological dimensions 
of Buddhist anti-realism about the self:  
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When I believed that my existence was such a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. 
My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at 
the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass 
tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air. There is still a difference between my life 
and the lives of other people. But the difference is less. Other people are closer. I am less 
concerned about the rest of my own life, and more concerned about the lives of others 
(Parfit 1984, 281). 
 
The glass tunnel is meant to represent a horizon that circumscribes the scope of a human 
life understood as a bounded self with a singular destination (death). The singular 
inevitability of the destination circumscribes the dimensions of the tunnel and the sense 
that this is all happening to me. But when we let go of the idea that there is some 
irreducible difference between ourselves and others – instead embracing the idea that 
these differences are only one of degrees – then the walls of the glass tunnel dissolve, 
and we can live in the open air and serve others. At the risk of simply reporting my 
own existential intuitions, I find this kind of aspiration to be both affirming and worthy 
of pursuit. Whatever meaning and happiness might result from its implementation 
might be very different from those varieties that Struhl and Siderits are concerned 
about, but it strikes me that these more selfless varieties of meaning and happiness are 
worth wanting and that they line up precisely with Buddhist soteriological 
prescriptions. So, my question at this juncture is why not just go all the way in on the 
Buddhist program? Struhl and Siderits seem to want the metaphysics of anti-realism 
but are reticent to adopt the moral psychology and soteriology that accompany the 
Buddhist program.  
 I now want to consider Struhl’s take on how anti-realism about the self can be 
realized on the phenomenological level. It is not enough to have true beliefs about what 
there is. If one is serious about living a life in accordance with such beliefs, according 
to Buddhist soteriology, a rigorous course of action is likewise required, one that 
uproots and eliminates the distorting influences of those unwholesome mental states 
that keep us miserable and bounded to the illusion of self. Struhl puts this point in very 
strong terms when he claims that: “Extinguishing the illusion of self would require 
dispelling not just the attachment to the idea of self at the cognitive level but also the 
more primal appearance of self at the phenomenal level. Among other things, it would 
need to eliminate the first person perspective. There would be no first person 
perspective, because there would be no self inhabiting the person” (Struhl 2020, 129). 
However, I think this is too extreme. It doesn’t follow that one would have to eliminate 
the first-person perspective  without a precise definition of what that means. Here I 
question Struhl’s reliance on Wright (2018) as a tag point for understanding Buddhist 
enlightenment and the difference between first and third-person perspectives.  
  Primary Buddhist literature is chock full of analyses of enlightenment, many of 
them very different. It is arguable that many canonical description of Buddhist 
enlightenment are incompatible with eliminitivism about the first-person perspective 
for the simple reason that the first-person perspective is, among other things, about a 
capacity to experience things as seeming a certain way from a contingent embodied 
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point of view (Nagel 1974). Without such a perspective, it is unclear how the 
achievement of liberation – which includes insight into one’s past karmic conditioning 
and reflexive recognition of one’s own emancipation – could be possible. So, I’d be 
interested to hear more about how the elimination of the first-person perspective does 
or does not line up with more classical approaches to enlightenment contained in the 
Pāli suttas and elsewhere. One possible way forward here is to understand the 
conceptual connections between a more robust, and perhaps linguistic understanding 
of the first-person perspective and the kind of perspective afforded to an organism on 
the basis of its evolved capacities for perception and action (Baker 2013). Struhl makes 
passing reference to this contrast between a first-person perspective and a perceptual 
perspective (cf. footnote 18, bottom of p. 129) but it needs to be explained in more 
detail in order for Struhl’s brand of elminativism about the first-person perspective to 
make conceptual sense in light of the Buddhist soteriological motivations that seem to 
undergird it.  
 I turn now to Struhl’s construal of the epistemic role of vipassanā meditation in 
bringing about the phenomenological changes necessary for full appreciation of the self 
being an illusion. Struhl endorses a hermeneutical strategy that I will call 
‘verificationism’, a highly empirical gloss on the role of meditation in Buddhist 
soteriology. Here’s Struhl:  
 
The main assumptions on which these arguments are based – the impermanence claim, the 
claim that the psychophysical processes are not under our control, the exhaustiveness 
claim, and the claim of dependent origination – all require some verification in experience, 
and vipassanā provides a controlled way to verify the claims experientially. Through 
vipassanā, one can observe the way mental processes arise as a result of other mental and 
bodily processes (verifying dependent origination), one can observe how rapidly these 
processes arise and disappear and are replaced by other mental process (verifying 
impermanence), and one can ultimately come to recognize that there is nothing behind 
these processes that can be called a self (Struhl 2020, 130).  
 
I wonder if there is a better way to understand the functional role of vipassanā in 
Buddhist soteriology. Consider two of the various body contemplations in the 
Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (MN I 55; Anālayo 2003). Here we are encouraged to imagine the 
various stages of the slow decay of a corpse, we are also asked to consider the body as 
merely a pile of unrelated elements. One particularly poignant example is when the 
body is compared to the dismembered portions of a cow being surveyed by a butcher. 
Even the most superficial reflection on the body shows that it is a highly integrated and 
self-regulating system. These contemplations do not verify a fact but project onto the 
body an image that is used to create an attitude in the mind of the individual whose 
body it is. As Shulman points out, “The example of the butcher hints that the 
practitioner is doing much more than neutrally scrutinizing his body…Rather, he is 
internalizing a philosophical position with a specific idea of what corporeal existence 
is about” (2014, 120). Additionally, this philosophical position is highly norm-laden 
and goal oriented; it is designed to engender a specific attitude of detachment and 
dispassion towards the body with an aim to liberation from dukkha. Thus, I think bald 
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verificationism is not an apt epistemic model for understanding the functional role of 
vipassanā in Buddhist soteriology, it flattens the normative import of the practice in a 
way that can’t be sustained upon deeper reflection on the contours of those actual 
practices being prescribed in the primary texts.14 
 In conclusion, I think that Struhl’s wish to combine Buddhist and modern scientific 
approaches to anti-realism about the self would be much enriched by further 
consideration of Buddhist philosophical resources outside of the Pāli suttas, especially 
the Abhidharmic debate between Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavādins. To be sure, I am 
very much an enthusiast for the Pāli literature (see Smith 2019; 2020a; 2020b) and was 
gratified to see how centrally they figured in Struhl’s arguments. Even so, I hope my 
pointing to some other sources will be seen demonstrating my sympathy with Struhl’s 
project rather than in tension with it. Second, I remain curious about the relevant 
similarities and differences between neuroscientific approaches to anti-realism about 
the self and Buddhist approaches. I have attempted to raise some questions about this 
to stimulate further discussion about what exactly we take ourselves to be up to when 
we say the self is an illusion. Finally, I have attempted to offer some alternative 
readings of Buddhist approaches to suffering and its cessation. I wish to again extend 
my thanks to Karsten Struhl for the stimulating paper and to the editors of Comparative 
Philosophy for inviting me to contribute to the discussion. I hope my questions are 
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